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Key bilateral relations in world politics today – from Sino-Indo ties to EU-US 
relations – have been formalised under the label “Strategic Partnership”. 
Germany’s Federal Foreign Office maintains eight strategic partnerships 
with a broad variety of partners. We analyse the problems associated with 
strategic partnerships, and offer a five-point proposal whereby Germany 
could finesse this instrument and use it more effectively.
 • Given the highly divergent group of countries with which Germany maintains 
formalised strategic partnerships, there is a lack of clarity as to what a strategic 
partnership entails.
 • Whereas actual bilateral relations differ greatly from country to country, two 
key elements characterise almost all of Germany’s strategic partners. They are 
located outside the transatlantic orbit and they play a growing or continuingly 
significant role in regional and global governance; many of Germany’s partners 
are indispensable for the solution of 21st century collective action problems. 
 • Germany could put this diplomatic instrument to more effective use: 1) focus-
ing on “ability” and “will” (rather than a resort to moralization) 2) asking the 
question “which global public goods” is the partner country willing to provide 
3) identifying clear red lines and abiding by them 4) building in an incentive 
structure based on “Reform for Responsibility” and 5) working in coalitions.
Policy Implications
Being more explicit about the purpose of individual strategic partnerships would 
make them a more viable diplomatic instrument. Our proposal suggests ways 
whereby Germany’s strategic partnerships could be better targeted.  Effective 
strategic partnerships could generate very high gains – not only for Germany, 
but for the world at large via the attention they pay to the joint  provision of pub-
lic goods, and everyone concerned with questions of global order.
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The Diplomatic Instrument
The Federal Foreign Office has eight “Strategic Partnerships” with a variety of part-
ners in Asia as well as one each in Africa, South America, and the Middle East. [1] 
The qualifier of “strategic” is seen by the partners and also third parties as a symbol 
of the high importance that is attached to the particular relationship. The ques-
tion arises: does this diplomatic instrument generate gains proportionate to the 
expectations that it raises and the efforts that it requires? In this article, we analyse 
the problems associated with strategic partnerships, and offer a five-point proposal 
whereby Germany could finesse this instrument and use it more effectively. While 
the focus of this paper is Germany’s strategic partnerships, some of the proposals 
may apply to the strategic partnerships of other countries too.
Problems
A strategic partnership is an important way of signalling Germany’s commitment to 
harnessing and further enhancing the particular bilateral relationship. It also has 
demonstration value for other potential partners aspiring to a closer relationship 
with Germany. Insofar as strategic partnerships promote not only bilateral interests 
but also advance the provision of certain global or regional public goods, they can 
also generate systemic gains. But the concept of a strategic partnership also comes 
riddled with three problems. 
First, analysts and practitioners question the utility of the concept when it is 
used to describe the country’s relations with such a wide range of countries – de-
mocracies and non-democracies, large and small, countries with which  Germany 
has only a few and very specific interests and others with which its interests are 
much broader, like-minded potential allies and also fundamentally different poli-
ties. With regard to China (and Vietnam perhaps), for instance, the strategic  partner 
terminology seems to reflect the importance of a bilateral relationship, which 
 suffers from fundamental disagreements in some fields but nonetheless is central to 
 German economic interests. In contrast, in the case of Australia, the label appears 
to highlight a bilateral relationship characterised by close cooperation and agree-
ment in a diverse array of fields – without necessarily touching Germany’s core 
economic or indeed strategic interests. Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and India in 
turn comprise a group of democratic rising or regional powers widely regarded as 
key players in the so-called Global South. In contrast to Australia these countries 
have at times proven to be relatively “difficult” partners as Germany’s core interests 
overlap only occasionally, cultural understanding is more limited, and the level of 
economic development diverges. Nonetheless, their current or future role in  regional 
and global governance justifies the label “strategic.” The United Arab Emirates are 
an outlier as relations neither touch upon Germany’s core interests nor are the 
Emirates a partner with a key role in regional or global governance. 
Naturally, the variety of the strategic partners is mirrored in the diplomatic 
instruments employed in bilateral relations. With Brazil, China, and India, for 
instance, Germany maintains regular intergovernmental consultations under the 
chairmanship of heads of governments – the most comprehensive form of  bilateral 
consultations. By contrast, regular consultations with Australia, Indonesia, and 
1   Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
South Africa, and the United 
Arab Emirates.
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 Vietnam are held on the level of senior officials from the foreign ministries. Nor 
is the definition of strategic partners uncontested within the German government 
itself, as, for example, the Chancellery maintains its own directory of strategic part-
ners. Rather than serve as a refined instrument of German diplomacy, the concept 
seems to have become more of a catch-all and aspirational label for partners outside 
the transatlantic orbit. Finally, the obscurity surrounding the term is not surprising 
given the proliferation of so-called strategic partnerships globally: whereas the EU 
has established 10 (including all major world powers plus a group of industrialised, 
middle powers), reportedly India has more than 20 and China 47 (2014). 
Second, once a country has been elevated to the status of a strategic partner, a 
downgrading is almost impossible without some very serious diplomatic costs. The 
concept is thus one that seems to lack flexibility.
Third, German foreign policy vis-à-vis its strategic partners often seems to 
 pursue an array of “altruistic” goals. To be sure, German diplomats are aware of 
Germany’s economic interests and they spend a great deal of time and effort in 
forging closer ties between German businesses and those of partner countries, par-
ticularly so in the growing Asian economies from China to India and Indonesia. 
Yet, when reflecting upon issue areas beyond economics, objectives such as the 
rule of law and human rights in partner countries, regional peace and stability, 
climate change mitigation, and the unobstructed dispensation of development aid 
figure prominently on the German side of the negotiating table. This is particu-
larly the case when it comes to Germany’s relations outside Europe and the Euro-
pean near-abroad, where Germany still lacks a clear role to fulfil. Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier’s recent article in Foreign Affairs – although being primarily concerned 
with Germany’s role in Europe and the Middle East – exemplified German foreign 
policy-makers’ self-understanding as a global power in pursuit of altruistic foreign 
policy objectives: “Germany will be a responsible, restrained, and reflective leader, 
guided in chief by its European instincts” (Steinmeier 2016). However, although 
strategic partners recognise Berlin’s growing importance they are unlikely to un-
critically share Germany’s self-depiction as habitually pursuing the global good 
over more narrowly defined national interests. The rift in mutual understandings 
may be deepened by a widespread perception on behalf of German diplomacy with 
regard to partner countries’ interests, which – so the narrative goes – tend to  focus 
on their own national interests from investments to technology transfer and military 
hardware. Insofar as many of Germany’s strategic partnerships clearly aim to go 
beyond narrow bilateral discussions and seek to jointly provide some global or re-
gional public goods – be it regional stability or climate change mitigation via green 
technologies – considerations above point to the difficulties that this instrument 
will continue to encounter in achieving Germany’s “altruistic” goals.
Reframing the Negotiation Position 
There is a major issue of definition in Philosophy and Economics on where altruism 
stops and where self-interest begins. And definitions can vary greatly depending on 
who one is and where one sits. What we in Germany see as altruism may be seen 
quite differently on the outside. So for example, if Germany tries to contribute to 
the maintenance of regional stability, we might see this as altruistic but the other 
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players might see this as a very straightforward interest-based attempt to pre-empt 
any adverse spill-over effects into Germany and Europe that are a consequence of 
unstable world regions. Or, to take an even starker example, Germany might see 
the push for better labour standards as highly altruistic, but the “Global South” will 
likely see this as an invidious attempt to undermine a major source of their com-
parative advantage. We find the same potential conflict arise when human rights are 
mentioned, and the old debate on intervention versus sovereignty. 
It is also worth mentioning that negotiation analysis shows us that framing 
one’s interests in terms of high-level moralistic principles – such as fairness or jus-
tice – tends to polarise the debate and makes the negotiation more deadlock-prone 
(Bazerman and Neale 2010). Altruism falls into this same category of moralistic 
framing. Throwing in even implicit expectations of altruistic behaviour on the part 
of one’s strategic partners, and prior assumptions of one’s own altruism in a nego-
tiation, not only unnecessarily complicates the analysis but also may jeopardise the 
actual process of negotiation.
The heterogeneity of strategic partners and our critique of moralisation in in-
ternational relations should not obscure a potentially timely and pertinent idea 
behind the concept: in a complex, multipolar world with ailing global institutions 
strong bilateral partnerships between established and rising, industrialised and de-
veloping, Northern and Southern governments are a prerequisite for the solution of 
global collective action problems. The provision of global public goods – for example 
in the economic, digital, environmental, and security domains – is a strategic inter-
est shared by all major powers. Seen through this lens, strategic partnerships can 
and should be more than the mainly symbolic recognition of status in international 
affairs. They aim to be an expression of the mutual desire to go beyond the narrow 
management of bilateral affairs and to find a common approach to global issues. 
How might strategic partnerships build on these aims to achieve their full potential?
We suggest some ways in which the problems identified above might be over-
come, and how Germany could put its strategic partnerships to more effective use. 
All the solutions we propose require (as discussed above) one important change 
in how Germany frames its own negotiating position, and also the demands that it 
makes of others, by reconsidering the notion of “altruism”.
Solutions
Is there a better way to identify mutual interest profiles, and negotiate with stra-
tegic partners such that we find a decent zone of agreement and also contribute to 
some public goods? We suggest below a five-point proposal, which could potentially 
be incorporated in the framing of Germany’s strategic partnerships. 
1) Focus on “Ability” versus “Will” 
“Ability” is one of the axes that many German diplomats already take into account 
when defining their own interests as well as those of their strategic partners. Add-
ing the “will” variable allows us to capture another parallel set of considerations. The 
idea of using both “ability” and “will” variables for systematically developing mutual 
interest profiles derives from the seminal writings of Charles Kindleberger on the 
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Great Depression (Kindleberger 1973). Kindleberger had argued that the reason 
why the Great Depression was so severe and prolonged was because, “In 1929, the 
British couldn’t and the Americans wouldn’t” take on the responsibility of providing 
the necessary conditions to preserve global economic stability. And in some ways, 
we have seen a replay of the same debates, in recent years, when the established 
powers have turned to the rapidly growing economies of China and India, and asked 
them to take on global responsibilities in proportion to their enhanced economic 
power. When working with these expectations, we in the West were pointing to their 
growing abilities. But what we also need to pay more attention to is the question of 
their “willingness” to provide global public goods (Narlikar 2013). And this inevi-
tably requires us to engage with the question of values because willingness derives 
from the values of a country and its people – be they religious values or secular 
 values – and how these in turn shape their notions of territoriality, sovereignty, 
 human rights, and free markets.
What would it mean to work with an axis of ability and willingness? For 
 example, we might find that a country like India has increasing ability (deriving 
from its growth and development) to contribute to climate change mitigation, but 
also increasing willingness to do so as the Paris negotiations of last year showed 
(Narlikar and Plagemann 2016). A country like China may have the ability to con-
tribute to regional peace, but has shown a clear lack of will to do so in recent months 
with the escalation of maritime disputes. In the case of Germany, engaging with the 
willingness and ability of others will be important because this will help determine 
which buttons can be pressed, where the pressure can be applied, and also what 
the deal-breakers might be. A systematic analysis of strategic partners’ willingness 
and ability in contributing to global public good provision will be more helpful in 
identifying mutual zones of agreement, and the limitations thereof, than expecting 
and – even if implicitly – requesting the same kind of “altruistic” behaviour that 
we – falsely or not – attribute to our own foreign policy. Key to this, of course, is 
a profound understanding of the limits with regard to the willingness and ability 
of partner countries in those policy fields important to German interests. Surely, 
the German Federal Foreign Office with its wide network of representations and 
sources possesses the capacity to generate such an understanding, a comparative 
benefit when seen against the capacities of many of its strategic partners as well as 
other line ministries within Germany.  
2) Ask the question: “Which Public Goods”?
In discussions with some of the countries that are our strategic partners it  frequently 
seems that they very unwilling to share the burden of public goods that we would 
like them to join us in providing – be this values such as human rights, or things we 
have always assumed to be fairly pragmatic and straightforward such as free trade 
and climate change mitigation. In the blame games that result, sometimes these 
strategic partners respond with the argument: you cannot expect us to share the 
costs of providing public goods that we had no voice in choosing in the first place. 
This is a fair point, but the discussion cannot stop there. We need to ask our  strategic 
partners, if not these global public goods, which alternative public goods are you 
willing to provide (Narlikar 2013). This requires a much better  understanding of the 
cultural traditions and historical trajectories that underlie the negotiating positions 
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of our counterparts (Narlikar 2016). In some cases, we might get easy answers – for 
example climate change mitigation efforts from the small island economies work in 
the same direction as ours. In others, we may find some surprising and new ideas 
and allies for cooperation – in the case of India, respect for democratic institutions, 
policing the open seas, or animal ethics, for instance, are likely to find considerable 
support. Even asking the question of – which public goods – will be an important 
step as it will be likely welcomed by many of our strategic partners as a genuine op-
portunity for agenda-setting.
3) Identify clear red lines 
We need to know our clear red lines and also those of our partners. Of course, these 
red lines should be used with caution. And in general, it’s a good idea to abide by 
the red lines – identifying a red line publicly and then not sticking to it is seldom a 
good idea because it reduces the credibility of one’s demands. But the red lines (be 
they internal or external) are important also for another reason: because they can 
help one distinguish between one strategic partnership and another, and thereby 
fine-tune this instrument much more than is the case at the moment. We might, 
for instance, decide that we would rather not work too closely with non-democratic 
regimes, but nonetheless want to make the most of our trade with them. If this is 
the case, the strategic partnership then needs to be framed as such, in a more lim-
ited manner. This may sometime make the negotiation process more difficult. But 
clarity on these goals upfront can effectively communicate our expectations and 
avoid misunderstandings among the partners. With others, we may choose to have 
a deeper and broader strategic partnership, especially if the partner has both values 
and interests that align better with ours. 
4) Build in incentives: “Reform for Responsibility”
For many of the countries with which Germany wants to negotiate, the inadequacy 
of governance structures – such as the United Nations, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank – is clear, and they have lobbied hard for their reform. 
And indeed, at least in theory, the legitimacy of global institutions would increase 
considerably, once their decision-making processes better reflect today’s multipolar 
world. The mistake that the established powers have made thus far is not to have 
a clear strategy on this – individually or collectively. So reform has been knee-jerk 
and not systematic. On the one hand, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one 
of the few organisations which has come to include major developing countries at 
the high table of negotiations. On the other hand, it seems to be caught up for sev-
eral reasons in perpetual deadlock. This is not an exemplar of reform from anyone’s 
perspective. In other organisations though, reform has been even slower and hard 
to come by. A smart strategy here would be to have clear incentives in place; reform 
is a bargaining chip that should not be yielded easily. But it should be exchanged 
in return for a greater willingness to provide certain agreed upon public goods. So 
we suggest that we try to come up with a system of reform in exchange for respon-
sibility. The exact details would have to be worked out, but the point here would be 
that for certain strategic partners, Germany could offer support for the reform of 
international institutions on the condition that these partners agree to show greater 
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initiative and cooperation on the provision of certain public goods. This strategy 
would make even more sense once it has become clear that the purpose of “stra-
tegic” partnerships should be a collective engagement in global governance. And 
if there is one common thread uniting all rising powers, it is their discomfort with 
present global governance arrangements. 
5) Work in coalitions that go beyond strategic partnerships
Our strategic partnerships offer us a vital instrument, which with some finessing, 
could help us to build certain umbrella coalitions. By way of example, we flag up 
just three ideas here: 
1. European Union: the European project has taken a real battering in recent 
years via the Eurozone crisis, the migration and refugees crisis, and now the 
latest blow that takes the shape of the Brexit referendum. None of our strategic 
partnerships is directly with members of the European Union. But these part-
nerships hold a key to vital relationships outside of the European Union that 
impact upon Europe and are also affected by crises in Europe. This is all the 
more true as non-European partners will look to Berlin for continental leader-
ship. So, for example, it would be pre-emptive and sensible to build alliances 
with important third parties, which might help strengthen the European project 
further. These alliances could involve market access and green technology deals 
with some strategic partners. Working on this wisely could not only strengthen 
Europe’s hand, but could also come in handy in worsening Britain’s alterna-
tives and thereby ensuring Brexit takes place on terms that help deter future 
defections. Germany’s role in the European Union makes it a natural facilitator 
for such negotiations. To do this effectively requires an intensive coordination 
between the Political Departments 2 – managing Germany’s bilateral relations 
with European countries – and 3 – responsible for relations with African, Latin 
American, Asian and Middle Eastern countries – in the Federal Foreign Office. 
2. The group of the 20 major economies (G20): Germany will be chairing and host-
ing the next G20 summit in July 2017. We have vital opportunities here, and 
the Chancellery should draw on the extensive expertise of the Federal  Foreign 
Office with respect to the many G20 countries that it deals with. It would make 
sense to establish some continuity in the G20 agenda via Germany’s strategic 
partnerships, and use windows of opportunity with different partners on issues 
on which Germany has a long-standing interest – such as sustainable devel-
opment and climate change mitigation. In fact, some of these issues could be 
built in more proactively with selected strategic partners as the first step. The 
second step would involve building support for this agenda in the G20 working 
in alliance with the same strategic partners. Finally, the strategic partnerships 
could then be used to facilitate the implementation of the agenda, and thereby 
leading by example. 
3. United Nations Security Council (UNSC): Especially with the recently launched 
bid for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC by Germany, the timing seems to 
be right for rebuilding a coalition for reform. This is not a new agenda, and it 
is true that previous attempts at coalition-building have not been so effective. 
But this time, especially if Germany were to integrate this consideration into its 
strategic partnerships, more could be made of the coalitions that emerge. Espe-
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cially if one were to link this up with the “Reform for Responsibility” plus the 
“Which Public Goods” ideas, we might have some very potent and influential 
coalitions in the making.
Conclusion: A Sharper Diplomatic Instrument
A careful consideration of Germany’s strategic partnerships today is a timely en-
deavour. We have suggested ways in which this diplomatic instrument can be made 
more nuanced and better targeted. Our five-point proposal requires a framework 
where less reliance is placed (in general) on high levels of moralising. Within the 
proposal, we suggest ways in which Germany can identify its own interests more 
effectively (via explicit awareness of its red lines) and also communicate them 
more effectively (in terms of political will). In the same proposal set, we offer ways 
 whereby Germany can streamline its own initiatives through a better understand-
ing of the ability and will of its potential and actual partners on different issues. We 
also present bargaining mechanisms that Germany could use – via “which public 
goods”, “Reform for Responsibility,” and coalition-building – and thereby construct 
and sustain more effective strategic partnerships. Effective strategic partnerships 
could generate very high gains – not only for Germany, but for the world at large via 
the attention they pay to the joint provision of global public goods, and for all those 
of us concerned with questions of global order.
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